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SPINOZA ON METAPHYSICAL DOUBT 
AND THE “CARTESIAN CIRCLE”
abstract
This article offers an analysis and defense of the solution proposed by Spinoza to the “Cartesian circle” 
problem. Taking into consideration Spinoza’s sound analysis of the epistemic conditions of an authentic 
doubt, it will try to show, against the interpreters who maintain that Spinoza’s most explicit and 
consistent solution fails, that his solution offers a perfectly coherent account of the self-justification of the 
objective value of reason. I will also briefly indicate the intimate connection existing between Spinoza’s 
solution to the “Cartesian circle” problem and his conception of truth as its own standard
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My aim in this paper is to analyze the solution proposed by Spinoza to the problem 
traditionally known as the “Cartesian circle”. Arnauld, in his Fourth Objections to Descartes’ 
Metaphysical Meditations, formulated this problem in the following way:
We are sure that what we clearly and distinctly perceive is true only because God exists. 
But we can be sure that God exists only because we clearly and distinctly perceive 
this. Hence, before we can be sure that God exists, we ought to be able to be sure that 
whatever we perceive clearly and evidently is true. (AT VII 214)
Once we consider that the set of things that we conceive clearly and distinctly contains the set 
of rational ideas and principles, the philosophical problem involved in the “Cartesian circle” 
problem takes the form of the following question: How is it possible a self-justification of the 
objective value of reason? Finding a solution for this problem consists in showing that there is 
no vicious circle implied in such self-justification, thus clarifying its meaning and possibility. 
Of course, the task of legitimizing the truth claims of rational knowledge is justifiable only 
insofar as the skeptic challenge to such claims is taken seriously. In other words, it is necessary 
to justify reason only because challenging it was previously taken as possible.
Spinoza was well aware of this problem. Not only did he expound it in the Prolegomenon of 
his book on Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy, but he dealt with it again both in his Treatise on the 
Emendation of the Intellect (§79) and – what is less noted and explored by his commentators – in 
his Theological-Political Treatise (chapter VI with its note).1 The simple presence of this problem 
in two works where Spinoza elaborates or expounds his own philosophical thought, and not 
Descartes’, is already a strong indication that he was not just aware of it as a “historian of 
Cartesian philosophy”, but also that he faced it as a true problem for him as a philosopher.
Now, what does a philosopher who claims that “truth is the standard both of itself and of the 
false” (EIIP43S, GII/124) have to say about this problem? Spinoza is generally seen as the very 
paradigmatic case of philosophical dogmatism found in modern times; as someone who, by 
affirming the identity between true ideas and certainty, would have suppressed the problem of 
1 These works will be henceforth referred to as PP, TdIE and TTP, respectively. All emphasis in quoted sentences was 
added.
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certainty, instead of really discussing it.2 His absolute rationalism seems thus to be based only 
on an act of blind faith in the value of reason. 
Spinoza’s complex theory of truth certainly entails that true ideas are, through their intrinsic 
property, directly recognizable without the need of any sign.3 Nevertheless, it is wrong to infer 
from that, that truth is immediately recognized or attained without any intellectual effort, or 
that no obstacles can hinder its self-manifestation. Indeed, Spinoza insists in many passages 
that the force of imaginative prejudices can blind our thought, hinder our apprehension of the 
distinction between true and false ideas, and raise doubts.4 Moreover, the fact that true ideas 
contain two distinct properties (adaequatio and convenientia), whose necessary connection can 
only be proved when we have an adequate knowledge of God, entails that, as long as we do 
not possess explicitly this knowledge implicitly involved in every idea (EIIP46, GII/127), we 
can doubt everything.5 Thus, even if it is true that struggling with skepticism is not Spinoza’s 
chief philosophical concern, this does not mean that he did not recognize the relevance of this 
problem in his system. 
It is also true that doubt does not and cannot perform any kind of methodological function in 
Spinoza’s epistemological thought. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the state of doubt – 
understood as an effectively experienced mode of thought, a modality of non-true idea that 
prevents the full self-manifestation of truth –, does not receive from Spinoza a very precise 
analysis, one that explains exactly in which conditions it necessarily takes place, and how 
we can legitimately remove it. While investigating this, Spinoza never avoids or denies the 
possibility of a genuine doubt about the truth of clear and distinct ideas. He faces this radical 
possibility and offers a solution. My intention is to investigate this solution.
2 Cf. Hubbeling, 1967, p. 35, and Hamelin, 1984, p.102. 
3 The full understanding of Spinoza’s concepts of truth and certainty requires a thorough interpretation whose 
presentation goes beyond the scope of this paper. I developed this interpretation in Gleizer (2017), where I attempted 
to show that Spinoza’s originality consists in suppressing the false opposition between the conceptions of truth as 
coherence and as correspondence. According to his theory, adaequatio (coherence) and convenientia (correspondence) 
are two complementary aspects necessarily involved in the concept of truth, so that, for an idea to be true, it must 
fulfill two conditions: be adequate and agree with its object. Adequacy, being an intrinsic property that takes part 
in the very definition of true ideas, also functions as what manifests their truth; not, however, as a sign, for signs 
are variable, arbitrary, and have no intrinsic connection with what they signify (see TTP chapter 2, and EIIP18S). 
Nevertheless, since the necessary connection between the intrinsic and the extrinsic properties constitutive of true 
ideas can only manifest itself when we grasp some of the consequences that follow from the adequate idea of God, as 
long as this idea and these consequences are nor grasped, doubt can arise. 
4 See, among other passages, TdIE §45 (GII/17) and §47 (GII/18), TTP Preface (GIII/8) and chapter XV (GIII/180). Even 
in the Ethics, we find passages where Spinoza insists on this point. The most striking one is found in the scholium to 
the very proposition in which Spinoza establishes that truth is its own standard (EIIP43S): “for to have a true idea 
means nothing other than knowing a thing perfectly, or in the best way. And of course no one can doubt this unless 
he thinks that an idea is something mute, like a picture on a tablet, and not a mode of thinking, viz. the very [act of] 
understanding” (GII/24). The expression “unless he thinks that” introduces precisely the condition under which a 
doubt concerning what does it mean to have a true idea becomes possible, this condition being the presence of an 
imaginative belief concerning the nature of ideas. 
5 See TTP Chapter IV: “Now since all our knowledge, and the certainty that banishes every possible doubt, depend 
solely on the knowledge of God – because firstly, without God nothing can be or be conceived, and secondly, 
everything can be called into doubt as long as we have no clear and distinct idea of God – it follows that our supreme 
good and perfection depends solely on the knowledge of God.” (GIII/59-60)
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To do so, it is first required that we expose Spinoza’s analysis of the conditions of possibility of 
doubt, as it is undertaken both in the Ethics and in the TdIE. Inverting the chronological order 
between these two works, let us begin by briefly recalling the main elements of the analysis 
proposed in the Ethics. This analysis can be split in two distinct moments: one negative and the 
other positive.
The negative moment consists in a detailed refutation of the foundations of the Cartesian 
theory of judgment and, hence, of its account of doubt and error. I shall not attempt to 
reconstruct Spinoza’s argument here, but his critique might be synthesized in the following 
theses:
1.1. “In the mind there is no absolute, or free, will” (EIIP48, GII/129).
1.2. “in the mind there is no absolute faculties” (EIIP48S, GII/129).
1.3. faculties of the mind are just entities of reason (EIIP48S: “…these and similar 
faculties are either complete fictions or nothing but metaphysical beings, or 
universals…”).
1.4. “in the mind there is no volition, or affirmation and negation, except that which 
the idea involves insofar as it is an idea” (EIIP49, GII/130). According to this important 
thesis, there is no difference between the act of considering a though-content and 
the act of giving assent to it, between the cognitive process by which a propositional 
content is considered and that by which this content is subsumed to a volitional act. 
This amount to saying that perceiving is the same as affirming something to be the 
case, or that propositions spontaneously take place as beliefs in the mind.
Thus,
1.5. the suspension of judgment is not an act of free will, through which the mind would 
be able to suspend assent to what is perceived by the understanding (EIIP49S, GII/134).
The exclusion of free will renders the analysis of the epistemic conditions of doubt very 
precise. The human mind, understood as a ‘spiritual automaton’, is submitted to the necessary 
laws regulating the logic of mental life, laws that are not disturbed by the presence of any 
“absolute power of decision” that would take us out of the realm of natural causality and 
explanation. 
Thus, the positive moment shows that, rather than being an act, the suspension of judgment 
is a passive state in which the mind necessarily finds itself whenever occurs a certain situation 
of conflict between two ideas. This state consists in a vacillation between these ideas.6 Since 
every idea involves an affirmation, doubt does not consist in the suppression of the idea’s 
affirmation, but in a logical instability brought about by the presence of a different and 
conflicting affirmation. This logical instability means that the mind, when in the epistemic 
situation of doubt, is not capable of arriving at a definite conclusion about the object of doubt.
What are the characteristics of ideas that conflict in doubt? According to EIIP49S, doubt takes 
place when the mind “sees that it does not perceive something adequately”, that is, when it 
6 In EIIIP17S, Spinoza asserts that between doubt and affective vacillation there is merely a difference of degree, 
and not of nature: “This constitution of the mind which arises from two contrary affects is called vacillation of mind 
(fluctuatio Animi), which is therefore related to the affect as doubt is to the imagination (see EIIP44S); nor do vacillation 
of mind and doubt differ from one another except in degree.” (GII/153)
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perceives that it has an inadequate idea. The doubtful idea is thus specified as inadequate, and 
the conflicting idea that raises doubt is characterized as the perception of a perception, that is, 
as a reflective judgment.7 
Let us turn now to the more detailed version of the analysis presented in the TdIE.
Here, Spinoza introduces his analysis of the idea dubia by way of the distinction between the 
merely verbal doubt and the authentic one (vera dubitatione in mente, §77). This distinction is 
a particular case of a broader distinction between what we can say and what we can think. 
Not only must we not confuse words and ideas, verbal affirmations and mental affirmations, 
but neither must we believe the former to be always expressions of the latter.8 Merely verbal 
doubt is a linguistic utterance that, because it does not satisfy the conditions of an authentic 
doubt, does not express any thought. 
According to §78, two conditions must be fulfilled if doubt is really to take place:
1. It is necessary, as in the Ethics, that two ideas be given: the idea of the object of doubt (idea 
p) and the idea that makes us be in doubt, that is, the reason, cause or motive of doubt (idea 
q). This means that no idea is doubtful in itself, but is rendered doubtful by its relation to 
another idea.9
2. It is necessary that the reason for doubting (idea q) be not clear and distinct, but confused. 
In Spinoza’s words:
There is no doubt in the soul, therefore, through the thing itself concerning which one 
doubts. That is, if there should be only one idea in the soul, then, whether it is true or 
false, there will be neither doubt nor certainty (…). But doubt will arise through another 
idea which is not so clear and distinct that we can infer from it something certain about 
the thing concerning which there is doubt. That is, the idea that puts us in doubt is not 
clear and distinct. (TdIE §78, GII/29-30)
According to this passage, and unlike the one quoted from the Ethics, there is no indication 
as for the character confused or not of the idea of the object of doubt (idea q). The possibility 
seems thus open for its being both confused or clear and distinct. Neither are there indications 
of whether the idea that throws us in doubt (idea q) originates from a reflective level or not. 
On the other hand, it is stressed that the reason for doubting is necessarily confused, for if it 
were clear and distinct, we could infer from it something certain about the object of doubt, in 
which case there would be no doubt. In Spinoza’s words:
Doubt is nothing but the suspension of the mind concerning some affirmation or 
negation, which it would affirm or deny if something did not occur to it, the ignorance 
of which must render its knowledge of the thing imperfect. (TdIE §80, GII/30) 
7 However, the conflicting ideas causing doubt do not seem to have necessarily a reflective origin, for in EIIP44S, 
where Spinoza explains the origin of our inadequate idea of things as contingent, he offers an example of vacillation 
caused by a conflict of imaginative ideas coming from a pre-reflexive level. 
8 On this respect, see EIIP49S, specially the following passage: “those who confuse words with the idea, or with the 
very affirmation the idea involves, think that they can will something contrary to what they are aware of, when they 
only affirm or deny with words something contrary to what they are aware of.” (GII/132)
9 Descartes already noted this relational condition of doubt in the (K) item of his Responses to the Seventh Objections: “It 
should be noted that throughout he [Bourdin] treats doubt and certainty not as relations of our thought to objects, but 
as properties of the objects which inhere in them for all time. This means that if we have once realized that something 
is doubtful, it can never be rendered certain.” (AT VII 473). The word ‘object’ here refers to mental items, such as 
ideas, perceptions or judgments.
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The reason for doubting, therefore, is a confused, imperfect and inadequate idea, and not a 
certain one. In other words, doubt (and hence the skeptical position) does not presuppose 
certainty: its roots lie in ignorance.10 Doney (1975) thus synthesizes the elements of this 
analysis: 
If someone claims that p is doubtful because it is possible that q, he implies that he does 
not know that q and also that he does not know that not-q. (p. 145).
This formulation indicates that the mere fact of considering something as possible lies in our 
ignorance about the cause (or reason) that necessarily posits or excludes it, and stresses also 
that to doubt p, another idea, different from p, is needed, namely, the idea q. To claim that 
p is doubtful simply because it is possible that not-p is not the same as offering a reason for 
doubt: it is merely a gratuitous and groundless affirmation of the possibility of not-p. Therefore, 
according to Spinoza, for every proposition p, if the only reason for doubting p is that “maybe 
not-p” (it is possible that not-p), then we have no reason for doubting it. Affirmation of doubt, 
in such case, becomes something merely verbal.
It is important to lay emphasis on the inadequate character of the reason for doubting and 
on its representation of things as possible. Affirming that reasons for doubt are necessarily 
inadequate or confused amounts to affirming that they are originated in the imagination 
and never in reason. This means that it is not reason that casts doubt on itself, that doubt 
does not spring from a disagreement between reason and itself. According to Spinoza, it is 
characteristic of rational knowledge to conceive things as necessary, while it is characteristic 
of imagination to consider them according to the modal categories of possibility and 
contingency. Spinoza understands these two modalities epistemically, in other words, they 
only express our ignorance of what renders things necessary or impossible.11 According 
to the analysis of fictitious ideas proposed in the TdIE, imagination takes advantage of this 
absence of intellection to engender, through passive associations of confused ideas, its 
fictions, hypotheses and suppositions about the essence and existence of things. We can form 
fictions only insofar as we consider some object as possible, that is, while its necessity or its 
impossibility is unknown to us. Thus, the power of forming fictions is inversely proportional 
to that of understanding (TdIE §58, GII/22), so that, after we have intellectually grasped the 
necessity or impossibility of an object, we can no longer mentally ascribe some predicates 
to it.12 Nevertheless, as long as this understanding has not yet happened, “we think that the 
things we more easily imagine are clearer to us, and think we understand what we imagine” 
(TdIE §90, GII/33). In other words, imagination, left to itself, takes itself spontaneously for a 
true knowledge: it is not “index sui”. Reasons for doubting are necessarily confused, but their 
10 Descartes also pointed out this aspect, emphasized by Spinoza as a necessary condition of doubt, in the (M) item of 
his Responses to the Seventh Objections. Against Bourdin’s objection that good and strong reasons for doubting should be 
certain, Descartes writes: “There may be reasons which are strong enough to compel us to doubt, even though these 
reasons are themselves doubtful, and hence are not to be retained later on, as I have just pointed out. The reasons 
are strong so long as we have no others which produce certainty by removing the doubt” (AT- VII- 473-474). Both for 
Spinoza and Descartes, a given reason for doubting has force only insofar as contrary intellectual evidence excluding 
it is not present, and not by virtue of any intellectual evidence it itself might have.
11 Cf. TdIE §53, EIP33S1.
12 Cf. TdIE §53 (GII/19-20): “Here I ask, what does such an idea concern? I see that it concerns only possible, and not 
necessary or impossible things. … If its necessity or impossibility, which depends on external causes, were known to 
us, we would have been able to feign nothing concerning it”; and TdIE §58 (GII/22): “after we know the nature of body, 
we cannot feign an infinite fly, or after we know the nature of the soul, we cannot feign that it is square, though there 
is nothing that cannot be put in words”.
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confusion is not necessarily manifest, and this accounts for their initial plausibility.
It is thus clear that an imaginative idea will work efficiently as a reason for doubting only 
insofar as the necessity or impossibility of what it displays “as possible” escapes us: that is, 
as long as there is no intellectual evidence (an apodictic apprehension) positing or excluding 
necessarily its object. It is only during this period of ignorance that the content of fictions, 
hypotheses and other kinds of imaginative ideas that drive the mind to a state of doubt can 
present themselves “as possible”.
Since every reason for doubting is thus an inadequate, confused idea that exhibits its object 
under the modality of possibility, how can we remove it? In order to achieve this, it is necessary 
and sufficient that we form an adequate idea that replaces the inadequate idea that raises 
doubt. If we are able to do this, we will know, to go back to Doney’s formulation, whether q 
is necessary or impossible, and we will either necessarily affirm or necessarily deny q. Thus, 
doubt about p will be excluded, for we will be able to infer from q something certain about p.
With all that in mind, let us now turn to Spinoza’s exposition of the problem of the “Cartesian 
circle”.
In the prolegomenon to PP, Spinoza thus presents the objection of circularity raised against 
Descartes:
But before we finish, it seems we must satisfy those who make the following objection. 
Since God’s existence does not become known to us through itself, we seem unable 
ever to be certain of anything (…). For we have said that everything is uncertain so long 
as we are ignorant of our origin, and from uncertain premises, nothing certain can be 
inferred. (PP p. 236, GI/146)
This objection is based on the following theses:
1. “God’s existence does not become known to us through itself”, that is, it must be an object of 
demonstration.
2. “Everything is uncertain so long as we are ignorant of our origin” (that is, of God’s existence 
and veracity).
3. “From uncertain premises, nothing certain can be inferred”.
Once we accept these three theses, we must infer that “we seem unable ever to be certain of 
anything”.
Having presented the objection, Spinoza goes on to expose his interpretation of the Cartesian 
response such as it is presented in the Principles of Philosophy, Part I, Article 13, in the Responses 
to the Second Objections, point 3, and in the end of the Fifth Meditation. According to Spinoza, 
Descartes’ response consists in weakening the second thesis, inasmuch as, in those texts, 
Descartes limits the scope of doubt to remembered evidences. Present evidence is beyond 
doubt and requires no divine guarantee, which has to do exclusively with the science of the 
conclusions that can be separated from their premises (and only when they are actually 
so). Propositions that require no proof (first principles, axioms or common notions), and 
demonstrations while they are being accomplished (present evidence), being unaffected by 
metaphysical doubt, do not require God’s guarantee. As Spinoza has it:
From the fact that we do not yet know whether the author of our origin has perhaps 
created us so that we are deceived even in those things that appear most evident to us, 
we cannot in any way doubt the things that we understand clearly and distinctly either 
through themselves or through reasoning (so long, at any rate, as we attend to that 
4. Spinoza’s 
presentation of 





of the Cartesian 
Response
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reasoning). We can doubt only those things that we have previously demonstrated to 
be true, and whose memory can recur when we no longer attend to the reasons from 
which we deduced them and, indeed, have forgotten the reasons. (PP p. 236, GII/147)
Now, since Descartes admits the possibility of proving the existence of God, as long as we 
remain attentive to all the premises (particular present evidences) from which this conclusion 
derives, it is possible to know this existence with certainty.
It is not my intention to discuss here the accuracy of Spinoza’s interpretation of the Cartesian 
solution. My aim is to analyze Spinoza’s other response – the specifically spinozistic one 
–, which is found also in the TdIE §79 and the TTP, and in which Spinoza speaks on his own 
behalf. This response is presented as an alternative to the first, since this one “does not satisfy 
some people” (GII/147). It is noteworthy that Spinoza never states explicitly that the Cartesian 
response does not satisfy himself, although in other places of his work he clearly expresses 
his dissatisfaction with some of Descartes’ demonstrations. Does he see this solution as a valid 
one? We shall see that this is not so.
Indeed, the simple fact that Spinoza presented his response as an alternative to the first, and 
not as a reconstruction of it, is enough to indicate that he shared that dissatisfaction. On 
the other hand, when we consider the introductory passages where Spinoza refers to the 
metaphysical doubt, we verify that they allude to passages of Descartes’ works where the 
scope of doubt seems not to be limited to remembered evidences, but to include also present 
evidences, as well as truths that are simpler than mathematical truths.13
However, it is not only the references employed by Spinoza that seem to suggest his 
dissatisfaction with a solution that seeks to limit the scope of doubt. This is confirmed by the 
way the problem is presented in the TdIE, in the TTP and in the very sequence of the PP.
In the TdIE, Spinoza expresses in the following way the possibility of the metaphysical doubt:
From this it follows that, only so long as we have no clear and distinct idea of God, can 
we call true ideas in doubt by supposing that perhaps some deceiving God exists, who 
misleads us even in the things most certain (maxime certis). (TdIE §79, GII/30)
No restrictions to the scope of doubt are formulated here: there is no mention of any 
13 The passages are the following:
a) Doubt concerning all things: “nevertheless he discovered a reason for doubting [mathematical truths]: for (…) 
deeply rooted in his mind was an old opinion, according to which there is a God who can do all things and by whom 
he was created such as he was. Perhaps this God had made him so that he would be deceived even about those things 
that seemed clearest to him” (PP p. 232, GI/143). This passage seems to refer to the end of the First Meditation where 
Descartes states that: “And yet firmly rooted in my mind is the long-standing opinion that there is an omnipotent God 
who made me the kind of creature that I am. (…) What is more, since I sometimes believe that others go astray in cases 
where they think they have the most perfect knowledge, may I not similarly go wrong every time I add two and three or 
count the sides of a square, or in some even simpler matter, if that is imaginable?” (AT- VII- 21). Even the simplest propositions 
and present evidence are here said to be within the scope of metaphysical doubt.
b) Liberation from all doubts: “For when he discovers that there is a most perfect being, (…) with whose nature being 
a deceiver is incompatible, then that reason for doubting which he had because he was ignorant of his cause will 
be removed. (…) Hence neither Mathematical truths nor any of those that seem most evident to him can be at all 
suspected” (PP p.235, GI/145). This passage seems to refer to the Third Meditation, where Descartes, after having placed 
the cogito along with mathematical propositions and axioms, concludes by saying that: “But, in order to remove even 
this slight reason for doubt [the metaphysical reason for doubt], as soon as the opportunity arises I must examine 
whether there is a God, and, if there is, whether he can be a deceiver. For if I do not know this, it seems that I can never be 
quite certain about anything else” (AT- VII- 36).
4.3. Rejection 




exemption on the part of simple propositions, common notions or present evidence. What is 
being stated is simply that, as long as we have no knowledge of our origin, and consider the 
hypothesis of a deceiving God, we can doubt “the things most certain”.
Nor does Spinoza make any restriction to the scope of doubt in the TTP. He says, in Chapter IV:
…all our knowledge, and the certainty which removes every doubt, depend solely on 
the knowledge of God: firstly, because without God nothing can exist or be conceived; 
secondly, because so long as we have no clear and distinct idea of God we may remain in 
universal doubt. (TTP, Ch. IV, GIII/59-60)
Finally, as the prolegomenon to PP goes on to show, Spinoza opposes himself to the Cartesian 
solution by clearly stating that the attention given to the demonstration of a proposition does 
not make us absolutely certain of that proposition:
We can not be absolutely certain of anything, except our own existence, even though we 
attend properly to its demonstration, so long as we have no clear and distinct concept of 
God that makes us affirm that he is supremely veracious (PP, p. 237, GI/148)
The passages quoted above show clearly that, for Spinoza, mere attention given to present 
evidence does not accord to this evidence an absolute certainty. What Spinoza seeks to call 
in question through the notion of “attention” is the legitimacy of assimilating persuasion 
(irresistible inclination to assent caused by the presence of evidence) to certainty. This is not 
to say that he does not acknowledge the factual impossibility of doubting present evidence. On 
the contrary, Spinoza acknowledges it inasmuch as, according to him, every idea (be it clear 
and distinct or mutilated and confused) involves the affirmation of its own content, that is, 
inasmuch as he makes no distinction between perceiving and affirming. In order to doubt, 
it is necessary to turn away from the idea of the object of doubt and consider the reason for 
doubting. Evidence can only be shaken retrospectively. As Spinoza puts it in the prolegomenon 
to PP: when we turn our minds’ eyes towards the nature of the triangle, we are “compelled 
to infer” that its three angles are equal to two right angles; but when our mind faces the 
hypothesis of the deceiving God, we can cast doubt on that property. Thus, to doubt it is 
necessary to turn the mind’s eyes toward the reason for doubting. Nevertheless, the impossibility 
of fact, or psychological incapacity, of doubting present evidence while considering it attentively 
is not to be confused with the logical exclusion of the metaphysical reason for doubting, and does 
not amount to establishing the right to know things as they are in themselves. The irresistible 
inclination to believe that p is not the same as the logical impossibility of doubting p. Besides, 
the moment of doubt must not engender a confusion concerning the object of doubt. If doubt is 
always retrospective, this does not mean that the object of doubt is not the value of present 
evidence as the criterion for truth. Therefore, as long as the movement of thought by means 
of which we psychologically and momentarily escape from the action of metaphysical doubt 
does not coincide with the movement through which the latter is logically destroyed, present 
evidence cannot be qualified as absolutely certain.
Spinoza, however, makes a noteworthy exception for the cogito. He not only qualifies it as 
absolutely certain, but takes it to be the very paradigm of certainty. In the beginning of the 
exposition of his response to the objection, Spinoza reminds the reader that:
When we previously discussed the certainty and evidence of our existence, we saw that 
we inferred it from the fact that, wherever we turned our attention (…), we came upon 
4.4. Reason for 
this rejection
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the Cogito
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no reason for doubting that did not by itself convince us of our existence. (PP, p. 236, 
GI/147)
Moreover, he affirms that after we have formed a clear and distinct idea of God, mathematical 
truths will be in the same situation as the cogito:
Wherever we direct our attention in order to doubt some one of them, we shall 
come upon nothing from which we must not instead infer that it is most certain – as 
happened concerning our existence. (PP, p. 237, GI/148)
The cogito thus emerges as the paradigm of an epistemic situation in which the reasons for 
doubting are logically neutralized, being transformed into, or substituted by, reasons for 
believing. This clearly indicates the strategy of justification that Spinoza will adopt, which 
consists in suppressing the obstacle that hinders us from believing in the truth of our clear and distinct 
ideas. It must be stressed, however, that, if the cogito is taken, in that text, as the paradigm of 
certainty, Spinoza does not understand it as furnishing the inescapable point of departure or 
the sole premise from which it is possible to develop an unshakeable proof of God’s existence. 
He clearly affirms that, in order to suppress metaphysical doubt, we just need to arrive at the 
clear and distinct idea of God, “however we have acquired it” (PP, p. 238, GI/148).14
According to this analysis, it seems clear that Spinoza is not satisfied with the solution that 
tries to attack thesis (2) in order to limit its scope. As long as the fiction of a deceiving God is 
considered “as possible”, he accepts the maximum expression of metaphysical doubt.
In order to move forward into the properly spinozistic response, it is necessary to examine 
how Spinoza sets the problem, that is, how exactly he understands the three theses enunciated 
above.
The first thesis (“God’s existence does not become known to us through itself”) does not seem 
to pose any interpretive difficulty. We find, for example, the following passage in the TTP, 
Chapter VI:
As God’s existence is not known through itself, it must necessarily be inferred from notions 
so firmly and incontrovertibly true, that no power can be postulated or conceived 
sufficient to impugn them (TTP, Ch. VI, GIII/84)
14 Curiously, no exception for the cogito is found either in the TdIE §79 or in the TTP, and even by the end of the 
Prolegomenon to the PP, where Spinoza presents the objection of the “circle” in a syllogistic form, he concedes the 
major premise of this syllogism formulated in a totally general way: “we can be certain of nothing before we have 
a clear and distinct idea of God” (GI/149). However, Spinoza makes some implicit references to the certainty of the 
cogito in the TdIE (§54, GII/20, and §58, GII/22), and even uses it as a kind of last resort to refute those skeptics who, 
being afraid to confess that they exist if they say that they know nothing, are like “automata, completely lacking a 
mind” (§§47-48, GII/18). The problem, therefore, is to determine the specificity of its certainty. Although it resists the 
metaphysical doubt, it does not destroy the deceiving God hypothesis. As far as the cogito is concerned, reiteration of 
doubt strengthens its certainty. In this case, the metaphysical reason for doubting is neutralized by logico-pragmatic 
reasons, but the internal inconsistency it implicitly involves is not revealed. This is the reason why we must not 
say that the metaphysical doubt is destroyed, but only that its scope of action is limited because it comes across a 
specific case that resists it and repeatedly neutralizes its effect. We may, therefore, distinguish three modalities of 
neutralization of doubt: 1) present mathematical evidences only escape psychologically and momentarily from the 
action of doubt; 2) the cogito’s present evidence logico-pragmatically neutralizes this action, repeatedly resisting the 
assault of doubt without, however, destroying it; 3) the present evidence of the idea of God logically destroys the 
reason for doubting, liberating evidences (1) and (2) from the necessity of being constantly reactivated.





The Ethics, in its turn, reinforces the need of demonstrating God’s existence, this 
demonstration being precisely the object of EIP11. Contrary to what some interpreters 
maintain, it is thus clear that Spinoza’s solution does not consist in denying the first thesis, 
affirming an immediate, non-inferential access to the existence of God.15
As for the second thesis, we have already seen that Spinoza accepts its most radical expression 
as for its scope. There is, however, a second aspect of it that he seems to have altered. Instead 
of affirming that we can doubt everything as long as we have no knowledge of God’s existence and 
veracity, he affirms that we can doubt everything as long as we have no clear and distinct idea of God:
We can be certain of nothing – not, indeed, so long as we are ignorant of God’s existence 
(for I have spoken nothing of this) – but as long as we do not have a clear and distinct 
idea of him. (PP, p. 238, GI/149)
Spinoza establishes here a distinction between having knowledge of God’s existence and 
veracity and having a clear and distinct idea of God. What does this distinction mean? What is 
Spinoza’s purpose in making it?
He does not mean to hold that knowing that a veracious God exists is not important for the 
problem at hand, since he clearly affirms in the TTP that: “We doubt God’s existence, and 
consequently we doubt everything, so long as the idea we have of God himself is not clear and 
distinct, but confused.” (Chapter VI, marginal note, GIII/84)
The distinction introduced by Spinoza is intended as a way of indicating the deep root from 
which doubt springs, namely, the absence of a clear and distinct idea of God’s nature and 
the presence of a confused one. We can doubt clear and distinct ideas only insofar as we can 
doubt the necessary existence of a veracious God. Nevertheless, we can doubt this necessary 
existence only insofar as we do not have an adequate idea of God’s essence, but only a 
confused one. It is only by virtue of this confused idea that we are as easily able to affirm 
that God exists as to affirm that he does not exist, and also to affirm that he is a deceiver as 
to affirm that he is not. This confused idea, displaying God as having just a possible existence 
and as being a possible deceiver, is thus what renders metaphysical doubt effective. As Spinoza 
affirms in the prolegomenon to PP:
15 The interpretation according to which the validity of Spinoza’s solution to the “Cartesian circle” problem depends 
essentially on an immediate recognition of God’s perfection was supported by Martha Bolton (1985, see, particularly, 
pp. 382-384). It is true that, in the EIP8S2, Spinoza affirms that: “if men would attend to the nature of substance, they 
would have no doubt at all of the truth of P7. Indeed, this proposition would be an axiom for everyone” (GII/50), and, 
consequently, would be a per se nota truth. Nevertheless, the use of the conditional and the whole passage reinforces 
an important point made in the TdIE §§43-46, according to which the presence of prejudices prevents us from 
following immediately the proper deductive order, hinders what is evident by itself to be immediately evident for us, 
and forces our mind to prepare a way to apprehend what is per se nota. The problem of doubt arises only insofar as we 
have imaginative prejudices, but we naturally have them. In this aspect, Spinoza agrees with Descartes (although he 
completely disagrees as for the correct method to deal with prejudices). There is, however, an important difference 
between them concerning knowledge of God’s existence by minds already freed of prejudices. While Descartes 
maintains that this existence would be known without proof by these minds, through the mere contemplation of God’s 
nature (see, specially, the fifth postulate (AT- IX- 126-127) and the brief commentary to the a priori proof (AT- IX- 
129), both presented in the Geometrical Exposition that follows the Second Replies) – what amounts to deny, for them, 
the first thesis –, for Spinoza, when it is a question of knowing God’s existence from its essence, even these minds have 
to prove the reality of God’s definition as an absolutely infinite substance (EIdef.6), that is, since the “eyes of the mind, 
by which it sees and observes thing, are the demonstrations themselves” (EVP23S), they need to demonstrate the 
consistency of this definition through the genetic construction of this concept. This is precisely what is done in the 
first ten propositions of the Ethics, thus arriving, according to the TdIE’s injunction, “as soon as possible” (§99, GII/36) 
to God’s essence.
4.6.2. Thesis 2: 
the distinction 
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For to someone who does not have a true idea of God (…), it is just as easy to think that 
his author is a deceiver as to think that he is not a deceiver. Similarly, for one who has 
no idea of a triangle, it is just as easy to think that its three angles are equal to two right 
angles, as to think that they are not. (PP, p. 237, GI/147)
As we saw above, for doubt to take place it is necessary that two ideas be present, and also 
that the idea that causes us to be in doubt be inadequate, that is, it must involve the ignorance 
of something that makes it imperfect, exhibiting its object under the modal categories of 
possibility and contingency. The deep root of metaphysical doubt is the presence of an 
inadequate (confused) idea of our origin.16
It must also be stressed that Spinoza’s reformulation of the second thesis does not mean that, 
in order to solve the problem of the circle, it is enough to replace the demonstration of God’s 
existence by a clarification of His idea, for what he takes as a clarification of God’s idea is indeed a 
process brought about by way of demonstrations. As stated in the continuation of the passage 
from the TTP cited above:
But for us to be able to conceive God’s nature clearly and distinctly it is necessary 
for us to attend to certain very simple notions which they call common, and connect 
with them those which pertain to the divine nature; then for the first time it becomes 
evident to us that God exists necessarily and is everywhere, and at the same time that 
all the things we conceive involve in themselves the nature of God and are conceived 
through it, and finally, that all those things are true which we conceive adequately. (Ch. 
VI, marginal note, GIII/84)
It is manifest by this passage that the clarification of our idea of God is a demonstrative procedure. 
Forming a clear and distinct idea of God is nothing but demonstrating, with the help of 
common notions, what belongs to His nature (existence, omnipresence and veracity). 
However, if that is so, how can we be certain of the truth of this demonstration? How can 
we be certain that our demonstration has resulted in true knowledge of God, since we have 
started from uncertain premises? Indeed, we cannot presuppose the truth of the clear and 
distinct premises used in the demonstration without presupposing exactly what is at stake. 
This leads us to the third thesis (“from uncertain premises nothing certain can be inferred”) 
and to Spinoza’s solution to the “Cartesian circle” problem.
The third thesis contains the core of the matter. Does Spinoza accept it without any exception? 
In the Chapter VI of the TTP, he seems to deny it for the specific case of the demonstration of 
what pertains to God’s nature: 
Since God’s existence is not known through itself, it must necessarily be inferred 
from notions whose truth is so firm and steady that no power can be or be conceived 
by which they could be changed. At least they must so appear to us at the time when we 
16 Two aspects present in metaphysical doubt should be carefully distinguished. That which furnishes the occasion 
for the metaphysical doubt to arise is the application of a rational principle, namely, the principle of causality. Only 
when we ask ourselves for the cause or origin of our mind that doubt can arise. However, our ignorance of our origin 
is not enough for doubt to arise effectively: the mere absence of a clear and distinct idea of our origin is not enough to 
engender doubt. It is necessary to suppose that our origin could be such as to give rise to a gap between the demands 
of our rationality and the structure of reality. It is this supposition that receives its most radical figuration with the 




infer God’s existence from them, if we want to infer it from them beyond any chance of 
doubt. For if we could conceive that the notions themselves could be changed by some 
power, whatever in the end it was, we would doubt their truth, and consequently also 
doubt our conclusion, viz., God’s existence, nor would we ever be able to be certain of 
anything. (TTP, Ch. VI, GIII/84)
What exactly is going on here? Just before the moment we inferred, from common notions, that 
God exists – more precisely, that a veracious God exists – it seemed we could conceive some 
sort of power capable of changing those notions, that is, capable of rendering them false; 
because then, in that epistemic situation, we believed it was possible to conceive a deceiving God 
whose function was precisely to make us suspicious about the truth of our clear and distinct 
ideas. Indeed, our confused idea of God exhibited this as a possibility.
However, as Spinoza has it, at the moment we infer, from those uncertain notions, that a 
veracious God exists, it becomes impossible to conceive the existence of a deceiving God. 
According to the third thesis, shouldn’t this conclusion be uncertain? Spinoza’s answer is 
no. In this case, not only the conclusion is not uncertain, but it also suppresses the reason 
for doubting its own premises. The very conclusion hinders us from rendering its premises 
uncertain.
Is Spinoza consistent in this passage? I would say he is. To blindly accept the third thesis as 
having an absolutely general validity is to ignore the relational nature of doubt. No idea is 
uncertain in itself, but is rendered uncertain by the presence of a reason for doubting it. This 
reason is necessarily a confused idea that is effective as a reason for doubting only insofar as 
no contrary intellectual evidence is given which reveals the necessity or impossibility of the 
content it displays “as possible”. Therefore, what stands for a valid reason for doubting in a 
given epistemic situation may no longer be so in a different one. We also saw that, in order to 
suppress doubt, it is necessary and sufficient that we form an adequate idea that suppresses 
the inadequate one responsible for our being in doubt. The a priori proof of the necessary 
existence of a veracious God accomplishes precisely this suppression of the reason for 
doubting, replacing it by a reason for believing.
In effect, the only reason for doubting the truth of clear and distinct ideas is a confused idea of 
a deceiving God. Once we form the adequate idea of God’s nature, it makes us understand how 
and why it is necessary to attribute existence and veracity to God, at the same time revealing 
to us the contradiction contained in the hypothesis of a deceiving God. This fiction, therefore, 
becomes inconceivable – or, more precisely, that which was already inconceivable, but 
which we wrongly believed to conceive, is finally showed to be inconceivable. The reason for 
doubting is thus rejected as a Chimera, that is, as a verbal being lacking all meaning.17 Unlike the 
other rational demonstrations, the demonstrative movement culminating in the conclusion 
that a veracious God necessarily exists coincides with the movement that reveals the absurd 
and contradictory character involved in the skeptical hypothesis, logically excluding the only 
obstacle that hindered us from believing the truth of clear and distinct ideas. To demonstrate 
that a veracious God creates us is to demonstrate that the hypothesis of a deceiving God is 
contradictory, that skepticism about reason is not rational.
Thus, once we have formed a clear and distinct idea of God, this idea affects us in such a 
way as to make it impossible to think that God might deceive us. Therefore, just as with the 
17 In his Metaphysical Thoughts, Spinoza defines a Chimera as “that whose nature involves an explicit contradiction” 
(Part I, chapter I, note a, GI/233), and says that it is only “a verbal being because it is neither in the intellect nor in the 
imagination” (Part I, chapter III, GI/241). 
189
SPINOZA ON METAPHYSICAL DOUBT AND THE “CARTESIAN CIRCLE”
paradigmatic case of the cogito, wherever we turn the mind’s eyes so as to doubt the common 
notions from which we began, we can find nothing more that could enable us to infer their 
uncertainty. This means that whoever forms a clear and distinct idea of God’s nature destroys, 
in so doing, the only reason he had to doubt the truth of clear and distinct ideas and, a fortiori, 
to doubt the truth of the clear and distinct idea of God.
It could be objected that the necessity in which we find ourselves, once we have formed the 
adequate idea of God, of conceiving him as existing and veracious, and hence the impossibility 
of conceiving the existence of a deceiving God, are nothing but a necessity and an impossibility 
for us, which might not be a necessity and an impossibility in themselves. This objection amounts 
to affirming that it is possible that the adequate idea of the veracious God (a necessary 
proposition that prevents us from conceiving the existence of a deceiving God) has been 
given to us by the deceiving God himself, being, therefore, an absolutely false idea. Indeed, no 
greater subtlety and malignancy could be ascribed to a deceiving God.
 It is not clear at all that this objection is indeed conceivable, since it implies that we can still 
conceive precisely what has been shown to be inconceivable, and that we can still ascribe 
a meaning to the chimerical expression “deceiving God”. This objection was supported by 
Michael Della Rocca. He claims that: 
The skeptic does not have to concede that, once we have the clear and distinct idea 
that God is veracious, no reason for doubt of one’s clear and distinct ideas remains. 
The skeptic can still raise the powerful challenge: why should the world correspond 
to the deliverances of our most rational thorough investigation? The skeptic would 
still say that, for all we know, the world fails to match even the system of clear and 
distinct ideas that includes the distinct and clear idea that there is no deceiving God. 
The Spinoza of TIE §79 cannot consistently deny this skeptical claim for this claim was 
invited by Spinoza’s own allowance in that passage that, at the outset, we do not know 
that there is no deceiver. Surely, a truly supreme deceiver could bring about the falsity 
of even the thorough system of clear and distinct ideas that Spinoza speaks of in TIE 
§79. This is a possibility that Spinoza is in no position to rule out.18
His point here seems to be that, once Spinoza provisionally endorses the skeptical reason for 
doubt, this endorsement will preclude him from ever legitimately removing this doubt. This 
amount to accepting Bourdin’s position according to which what is a valid reason to doubt 
in a certain epistemic context should always remain valid, as if the process of conceptual 
clarification could not affect it.19 However, what the production of the clear and distinct 
idea of God precisely does is to transform the initial epistemic situation, showing that what 
seemed possible and thinkable at the outset (due to our ignorance), involves in fact a hidden 
contradiction. Once that contradiction is rendered manifest through this process, it is not 
18 Cf. Della Rocca (, 1994, pp. 33-34). Given the structural similarity between Spinoza’s solution and Gewirth’s 
interpretation of Descartes that Della Rocca criticizes in his article, the same point is made against the latter (pp. 23-
24): “The skeptic could respond to Gewirth’s interpretation of Descartes saying that: ‘even if we do have a clear and 
distinct idea that God exists and is not a deceiver, it still seems possible that this idea and the other clear and distinct 
ideas apparently validated by it are false – for why should the world correspond to the deliverances of our most 
thorough rational investigations? […] Descartes is not in a position legitimately to deny the skeptic’s claim. This is 
because the skeptic claim is invited by Descartes himself, in particular by his allowance at the beginning of the Third 
Meditation that there may be an omnipotent deceiver”. 
19 See notes 9 and 10. 
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possible anymore to entertain the metaphysical doubt, and hence there is no more reason to 
doubt the absolute truth of our clear and distinct ideas. What needs to be stressed here is that 
the plausibility of a reason to doubt depends on its displaying its object as prima facie possible, 
but of course, not everything that seems to be possible is indeed possible.20 
 Furthermore, even supposing that objection to be acceptable, it would not constitute a reason 
for doubting. As we saw above, it would consist simply in affirming that p (“a veracious God 
necessarily exists”) is doubtful because it is possible that not-p (“a deceiving God exists”), and 
this is nothing but a gratuitous affirmation (and not a reason for doubting). Just to affirm the 
possibility of not-p is not the same as exhibiting another idea (idea q) from which the possibility 
of this negation would follow. The rules of an authentic doubt would be thus disrespected.21 
In short, the situation would be as follows:
1) For every proposition p, if the only reason for doubting p is that “perhaps not-p” (or “it is 
possible that not-p”), then there is no reason for doubting p.
2) For every proposition p, if we understand clearly and distinctly that p, then the only reason 
for doubting p would be that perhaps God is deceiving us.
Now, since the proposition that “a veracious God necessarily exists” was clearly and distinctly 
demonstrated, we must go no further than to substitute p for this proposition in order to 
verify it to be beyond any doubt.
20 Della Rocca’s position is reminiscent of Frankfurt’s interpretation of Descartes, although Frankfurt affirms that 
Descartes’ argument leads to “a conclusion which excludes the possibility that there is a demon (or that human existence 
is a product of chance, or whatever)” (1978, p. 36), and that Descartes establishes that “there is no reasonable ground 
for doubting that reason is consistent” (1978, p. 39). Frankfurt raises the objection (without calling it a “reason 
to doubt”) that Descartes’ argument does nothing to show that the consistent system of clear and distinct ideas 
corresponds to reality. Since he accepts that Descartes gives an explicit account of truth as correspondence (p. 37), 
how can he avoid transforming this objection into an expression of the metaphysical doubt? His strategy consists in 
trying to show that Descartes is only concerned with the demands of certainty (understood as a rational confidence 
in the internal consistency of reason), and does not really care about absolute truth. Now, it seems to me that his 
main textual evidence in the Second Replies (AT- VII- 145) does not really support this dissociation between the search 
for certainty and the search for truth. The fourth reply taken in its entirety seems to show that the reason why we 
cannot believe in, or even have the least suspicion of, the absolute falsity of our clear and distinct ideas, is that, once 
we “became aware that God exists […] it is impossible to imagine that he is a deceiver” (AT- VII- 144, l.16-20). It is this 
impossibility, and not Descartes’ lack of interest in absolute truth, that “does not allow us to listen to anyone who 
makes up this kind of story” (AT- VII- 146, l.12-15). I will neither argue for this reading here, nor deal with the other 
support of Frankfurt’s interpretation, namely, Descartes’ perplexing doctrine of the creation of eternal truths. What 
I would like to stress is that Frankfurt’s interpretation of Descartes’ overall strategy for defending the consistency 
of reason, understood as an indirect procedure that removes reasons for doubting truths instead of proving them 
directly (1989, p. 228), seems to me a perfectly legitimate strategy for defending also the absolute truth of reason. 
Indeed, once truth is considered as being (or at least as involving) an extrinsic agreement between two distinct terms 
(thought and object), one of which can only be given to us through its true idea, what could count for us as a direct 
proof of this correspondence? How could it be possible in this case to give something stronger than an indirect proof? 
And if this is so, why could we not say that, once we formed the clear and distinct idea of our origin, this idea removes 
not only any grounds for doubting the internal consistency of reason, but also for doubting the existence of a gap 
between the rational system of ideas and the ultimate structure of reality? This seems to me exactly the strategy 
adopted by Spinoza, although, according to his theory of truth, what renders this gap impossible to conceive, namely, 
the idea’s adequacy is itself one of the two properties constitutive of true ideas. 
21  It should be noted that the distinction between an unjustified affirmation of the possibility that not-p and the 
exhibition of a ground for doubting p, that is, the effective production of an argument supporting the affirmation of the 
possibility of not-p, must be accepted by the pyrrhonic skeptic. In fact, the latter employs the principle according to 
which for every argument it is always possible to present an opposing, equally strong argument, and he grounds the 
epokhé exactly in this balance of forces. Therefore, in order to accomplish this balance of forces, it is not enough just to 
affirm the possibility of constructing a counter-argument, but it is necessary to construct it effectively. 
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There remains one question about the possibility of forming a clear and distinct idea of God, 
that is, about the possibility of fulfilling the necessary and sufficient condition for the suppression 
of doubt. The crux of the matter, as Spinoza puts it, consists in determining whether we can 
form this adequate idea “even though we still doubt whether the author of our nature deceives 
us in all things” (PP, p. 238, GI/148). To put it in another way: is it possible to form a clear and 
distinct knowledge of something while doubting the objective value of this kind of knowledge? 
Is certainty about the truth of clear and distinct ideas a condition for forming clear and 
distinct ideas?
Spinoza presents this question as the minor premise of the objection of the circle, which he 
reformulates and exposes as a syllogism in the end of the prolegomenon to PP: “we cannot 
have a clear and distinct idea of God so long as we do not know whether the author of our 
nature deceives us” (GI/149). What this premise restricts here to the clear and distinct idea 
of God has evidently a much greater scope than that, as indicated by Spinoza’s response. The 
premise could be thus reformulated: we cannot have any clear and distinct ideas as long as we 
ignore whether the author of our nature is deceiving us. So reformulated, this premise evokes 
a mistake made by Mersenne in the third point of his objections to Descartes’ Meditations, 
where he introduces the problem of the “atheist mathematician”. He writes:
Thirdly, you are not yet certain of the existence of God, and you say that you are not 
certain of anything, and cannot know anything clearly and distinctly until you have achieved 
clear and certain knowledge of the existence of God. It follows from this that you do not yet 
clearly and distinctly know that you are a thinking thing (…) Moreover, an atheist is 
clearly and distinctly aware that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right 
angles; but so far is he from supposing the existence of God that he completely denies 
it. (AT VII, 124-125)
Mersenne here heedlessly mistakes the proposition (a): whoever is not certain of the existence of 
God cannot be certain of anything, with the proposition (b): whoever is not certain of the existence 
of God cannot know anything clearly and distinctly. Spinoza, as well as Descartes,22 accepts (a) but 
denies (b).
Indeed, it is absurd to turn absolute certainty about the truth of clear and distinct ideas into 
a precondition for the possibility of their acquisition. In Spinoza’s view, this would amount 
to affirming that to know, I must first know that I know.23 If certainty itself was a previous 
condition for forming clear and distinct ideas, there would never be any metaphysical doubt, 
since the latter presupposes nothing less than that we have clear and distinct ideas and that 
we can doubt their truth.
Therefore, the central aspect of the solution of the “Cartesian circle” problem lies in the 
possibility of forming clear and distinct ideas and rational demonstrations while ignoring our 
origin and doubting the truth-value of such demonstrations. As Spinoza affirms in TdIE §79:
And just as we can arrive at such knowledge of the triangle, even though we may not 
know whether some supreme deceiver misleads us, so we can arrive at such knowledge 
of God, even though we may not know whether there is some supreme deceiver. 
Provided we have that knowledge, it will suffice, as I have said, to remove every doubt 
that we can have concerning clear and distinct ideas. (TdIE §79, GII/30)
22 Cf. Responses to the Second Objections, AT- IX-, p. 111.
23 Cf. TdIE §34, GII/14-15.
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The difference between the adequate idea of the triangle and the adequate idea of God is 
that the demonstrative movement of the first leaves untouched the conditions allowing the 
emergence of the metaphysical doubt, while the second’s demonstrative movement, inasmuch 
as it coincides with the explanation of the contradiction contained in the metaphysical reason 
for doubting, excludes the only possible reason for doubting our clear and distinct ideas, thus 
establishing absolute certainty.
To conclude I would like to briefly indicate the intimate connection that exists between 
Spinoza’s solution to the “Cartesian circle” problem and his conception of the self-
manifestation of truth (verum index sui). Indeed, this solution, based as it is on the logical 
power of the idea of the most perfect being, offers the most perfect exemplification of that 
self-manifestation. Spinoza’s solution consists in showing that the clear and distinct idea 
of God logically destroys the metaphysical reason for doubting clear and distinct ideas, and 
that we can form it while we still doubt the objective value of these ideas. Now, according 
to Spinoza’s theory of truth, clearness and distinctness rest on the intrinsic property that 
takes part in the very constitution of true ideas, namely, adequacy.24 Adequacy, understood 
as the demonstrative process that shows how and why something is necessarily the case, is 
an integral aspect of what it means for an idea to be true, so that it is not possible for any idea 
to be true if it lacks this aspect. Yet, to demonstrate something as being necessarily the case 
is tantamount to excluding the possibility of its negation, and thus the conceivability of its 
denial. Thus, Spinoza’s solution consists in showing that the intrinsic coherence and deductive 
power of our adequate idea of God, demonstrating its necessary existence and immanence 
to Nature, establishes the necessary connection linking adaequatio and convenientia, and 
renders inconceivable any gap between these two properties.25 The self-manifestation of God’s 
adequate idea coincides with the self-justification of the possibility of true knowledge, and 
with the dissolution of the darkness of metaphysical doubt. Spinoza’s solution shows hence 
that his thesis that “truth is the standard both of itself and of false”26 involves a perfectly 
consistent conception of the self-justification of the objective value of reason, and that his 
absolute rationalism is not grounded on an act of blind faith in this value.
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the attributes, the status of the human mind as a part of the infinite intellect of God, the identification of our 
adequate ideas with God’s ideas, and the proof that all ideas in God are adequate and agree with their objects. The 
very clarification of the ontological status of the human mind as a finite mode of the only substance renders thus 
impossible to conceive it as having any ontological and epistemological isolation from the rest of Nature. 
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